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Abstract The concept of animal culture began to be increasingly used in the
context of animal behaviour research around the 1960s. In spite of its success,
I shall argue that animal culture as it is currently conceived does not represent
a fully articulated “natural kind”. But how does it fail in this regard and what
consequences follow? Firstly, an analysis of the epistemological landscape of
author keywords related to the concept of animal cultures is presented. I then
systematically enumerate the ways in which culture cannot be considered a
natural kind in the study of animal behaviour. Finally, a plausible interpreta-
tion of the scientific status of the animal culture concept is suggested that is
congenial to both its well established use in animal behaviour research and its
inferential limitations.
Keywords animal behaviour · natural kinds · social learning · text mining ·
definition of culture · eliminativism
1 Introduction: Imagine there’s no culture
Anthropology has questioned the validity of the concept of culture since its
inception as an academic discipline. Curiously enough, towards the late 20th
century, this concept was rejected or at least was unendorsed by many of an-
thropology’s chief practitioners (see, for instance, Brumann 1999), yet around
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the same time, it might be regarded as one of the most successful1 philosoph-
ical concepts of the last two hundred years.
Equally ironic is the fact that around the same time that some of the main
figures of anthropology sought to abandon “culture” as a theoretical term,
it found fertile ground in the discipline of animal behaviour, hinting to some
form of strong naturalization of this elusive idea. Indeed, as different strands of
anthropology2 negated the theoretical power of “culture” as an explanatory de-
vice, the term’s use continued to spread eventually permeating animal ecology
textbooks (Manning & Dawkins 1999; see previously Elton 1930 about animal
“tradition”). During this period, many philosophers and social commentators
also continued using the concept of “culture” or the adjective “cultural” in a
theoretically loaded way (see references in Pinker 2003; Ramsey 2007), often
presupposing this predicate’s high inferential power, that is, an ability to refer
to a property whose very attribution warrants the inference of other properties
that are related to it in principle. Tacitly assuming such inferential powers,
one thing or behavior being termed ‘culture’ or ‘cultural’ usually meant that
a diverse bundle of properties could be attached to it (Bueno 1996).
But does “culture” really constitute one such natural kind from which
reliable inferences toward other interesting and meaningful related properties
or states of events can be made? This question has certainly been raised many
times before — mainly in the context of the nurture vs. culture controversy,
as well as in classical debates concerning the explanation vs. interpretation
of social facts. However, it has never been raised as such specifically in an
effort to examine the status of “animal culture” as a natural kind. This is not
an ineffective approach to the problem of determining the scientific value of
1 This grandiloquent seeming statement can be affirmed on the basis of some simple
statistics regarding the frequency with which it has been used over time. The substantive
“culture” was used only very rarely up until the end of the 18th century, after which time
it began to take hold. And indeed, what little use was made of the term occurred mostly
in reference to the cultivation of certain specific artistic or humanistic abilities. As the
theoretical scope of the term expanded during the 19th century within both philosophy and
the nascent discipline of anthropology, it was used with greater frequency, until penetrating
everyday language in the main Western languages, especially after World War II. According
to Google’s N-Gram research engine based on millions of digitalized books and journals
(Michel et al. 2011), there was less than 1 occurrence of “culture” for every 50,000 words
at the beginning of the 19th century. Nevertheless, the word attained frequencies exceeding
7 occurrences every 50,000 words by the end of the 20th century. Compare this with the
relative failure of the word “civilization” during this same period at frequencies bordering on
1 occurrence every 100,000 words — exceptions to this trend took place during brief periods
peaking around 1920 and 1940 at 1 occurrence every 25,000 words; although “culture” is a
polysemic term in English, similar results are obtained for other languages. This suggests
that the spread of the notion of culture may be one of the most noticeable examples of the
way that philosophy and science penetrate everyday language, even though this says nothing
about the validity of the notion as a general scientific term.
2 I will here overlook the subtleties that may derive from the consideration that the
American Anthropological Association, the main anthropological association in the world
in terms of membership, decided to erase the word “science” from its mission statement a
few years ago. Since several very influential scientific anthropologists have also raised serious
doubts about the relevance of “culture” as a theoretical term I believe my reference to a
philosophy of science take on anthropological perspectives is warranted.
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Fig. 1 Barplot containing the most employed word stems contained in the abstracts of
scientific papers related to “animal culture”.
the concept of culture. Triumph in revealing the contours of the kind “animal
culture” may provide a basis for its naturalization more generally. Conversely,
lack of success in establishing a scientific natural kind may also be judged, in
the extreme, as an indicator of the unreasonableness of trying to make culture
part of the natural furniture of the world, to be conceived on equal footing with
other more prototypical natural concepts such as electrons, chemical elements,
cells, or galaxies.
2 A conceptual landscape in animal behaviour research
First, let’s explore the way scientists use the term culture in the context of
animal behaviour research.
When researchers in animal behaviour publish a contribution in this area,
they are usually asked to provide an abstract of what their contribution
amounts to, as well as a few keywords describing connected topics. After as-
sembling a data base of around three hundred and fifty articles3 which were
published in some of the main journals of animal behaviour, primatology, and
ornithology, and which included the notion of “culture” or “tradition” in the
title, abstract or keywords, a few preliminary, purely descriptive observations
can be made. Particularly visible are what one might call the main “episte-
mological interests” or subjects on which the researcher is able to generate
3 This data base intends to be widely representative without of course being exhaustive.
For details on its elaboration see the online appendix.
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Fig. 2 Twelve most connected author-keywords in articles related to “animal culture”.
Thickness of links is proportional to frequency of co-ocurrence of these author-keywords.
publishable material. In Fig. 1, you can see the most frequently used concep-
tual stems in the abstracts of these articles. A series of epistemological interests
are clearly apparent: the notion of learning, a marked interest in behavioural
ecology, the study of differences between groups, as well as the stability and
variability of behaviour are among the interests that researchers allude to in
the most visible part of their publication.
The conceptual landscape can be represented in a more articulated manner
once the links between author-keywords enter the picture. This can be seen in
Fig. 2 with its depiction of the twelve main keywords connecting the articles
of this data base. Links between concepts represent the co-occurrence of two
keywords together within the same article. The thickest links represent pairs
of concepts that co-occur more often than others. This figure is helpful in
representing the actual areas in animal behaviour research in which the concept
of culture appears most often in connection to.
Curious about what the broader picture in which these concepts emerged
looks like? A conceptual landscape of animal culture can be generated by plot-
ting those keywords that appear at least in two articles. In this picture (see Fig
3), different colors refer to relatively different modular networks or relatively
independent areas of research. Some of the main regions seem to constitute
different epistemological approaches, at least in the sense that the most high-
lighted epistemological interests or keywords do not completely overlap with
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Fig. 3 Conceptual landscape of animal culture. See text for explanation.
those of other regions. Among these, one might point to the different episte-
mological interests that crystallize around different regions: a general region
related to primate behaviour, tool-use, and differences in foraging technology,
another region more connected to the general ecology of learning mechanisms
and avian and cetacean traditions, or yet another one linked to fish social
cognition and the behavioural ecology of public information.
3 A minimal definition of animal culture
Which concept of culture unites all of the aforementioned work in the study
of the evolution of behaviour? Let me be clear about the precise nature of the
question I am addressing: success in solving this question should be determined
by the adequacy of the definition for describing generally the researchers’ ac-
tivity in this area of knowledge. If I was to advance a definition of culture
that does not address what researchers do and how they use the language of
culture to describe their findings, I would have either failed miserably or have
attempted something entirely different. Some philosophers have attempted to
offer a normative concept of culture, proposing how scientists should use the
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term. My aim here is descriptive. In order to pursue this goal, I will mostly
follow a definition of the concept “animal traditions” proposed by Susan Perry
and Dorothy Fragaszy (2003) and adapt it to a general definition of animal
culture.
There is no intrinsic originality in this definition. Indeed, anthropologists
Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn famously brought together and inven-
toried more than 150 definitions of culture in the 1950s. Their list has surely
expanded considerably since that time. The definition that now follows owes
much to a long tradition of definitions going back at least to Franz Boas, the
famous forefather of American cultural anthropology. Again, my aim here is
to establish a reasonable minimal concept capable of capturing the commonal-
ities shared by the hundreds of contributions to the study of animal behaviour
that deal with the idea of culture or tradition.
With no further ado4:
A phenotypic character, an artifact or any byproduct of an individual’s
behaviour can be said to be ‘cultural” to the extent that it fulfills at varying
degrees the following cultural properties:
(a) being the result of a specific mechanism of social learning5
(b) being distributed in a population
(c) having a certain stability or permanence in time.
A corollary to this definition is that each of these different dimensions of
what constitutes a cultural entity admit of degrees.
This proposed minimal concept of culture has a number of characteristics
that are worth mentioning (for details see Anonymized):
– It is transparent to the extent that it is independent of strong theoretical
commitments.
– It is a concept based on prototypes or instances of what actual practicing
scientists consider cultural behaviour.
– It is a distributional or populational concept, to the extent that varia-
tion is an intrinsic part of its characteristics (Godfrey-Smith 2009). Under
4 I basically take Susan Perry’s and Dorothy Fragaszy’s proposal of what an animal tra-
dition is and wearing the philosopher’s hat divide it into three different cultural properties.
5 A reader of a previous version of this article complained that the concept allowed promis-
cuous inferences regarding traits not always thought to be “cultural” traits. For instance, the
reader claimed, if courtship behaviors are socially learned, then successful mating will be the
result of a specific mechanism of social learning. And if the mating produces offspring, they
(and their genetic constitution) will be the result of a specific mechanism of social learning.
It follows that genetic differences, and their associated phenotypic trait differences, are cul-
tural. Whereas my critic saw it as a weakness of the concept of culture which I endorse here,
I certainly do not. This kind of promiscuous inferences, though initially counterintuitive,
explain a number of crucial phenomena of gene-culture coevolution. See Sperber (2007) for
the need of a concept of culture which captures gene-culture coevolution. Also, please note
that the ‘`ıntuitive plausibility test” that the critic was proposing would be relevant if I was
implying that the offspring genetic differences are strongly cultural in all or just one of the
cultural dimensions, which I am not. The study of cultural influences in mate choice decision
making in non-human animals is an active research program registered in Fig. 3.
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this definition, behaviours, and effects of behaviour can be “more or less
cultural” (Sperber 1996).
At the risk of being redundant, our aim here is not to provide a brand new
definition, but rather to take stock of what unites all of the interesting animal
behaviour research conducted to date that treats of the notion of culture.
4 An elusive natural kind
As we have shown above, the concept of culture has been prevalent in the
study of animal behaviour for some decades now. However, the question arises
as to whether or not animal culture is a natural kind. But why is this an
interesting question at all? Why does it matter?
The question should arise particularly considering the previously proposed
culture concept. Such a concept, which attempts to represent what most re-
searchers in animal behaviour refer to when they use the notion of culture,
is a very minimal concept. In fact, the requirements for the behaviour of a
social animal to qualify as cultural are very low indeed. Under this concept
of animal culture, animal culture becomes an almost trivial phenomenon by
itself. With such a low threshold for qualifying as a cultural behaviour, the
interesting question becomes not so much whether a certain animal behaviour
is cultural, but rather: how is it cultural? In other words, what are the mech-
anisms contributing to the propagation of behaviour? What are the diffusion
patterns followed in its propagation? What is the ecological function of these
mechanisms?
Given the general nature of this concept, any apprehension one might have
concerning the prospects of understanding culture in terms of a natural kind
might be justified. A typical argument for what it means to be considered a
natural kind states that a grouping of entities within the framework of a well
corroborated scientific theory is a natural kind if the category that is formed
by those entities is underpinned by a series of deep and intrinsic characteris-
tics that allow a series of coherent causal generalizations to be based on the
existence of that category.
In philosophy it is often claimed that an inventory of natural kinds aspires
to capture the ‘furniture of the world” or at least the main elements that em-
anate from the scientific view of reality. Typically, the most basic categories of
the physical sciences, such as electrons or chemical components are considered
to be prototypical bona fide natural kinds.
More recently, however, an increasing number of voices in philosophical
theory have recognized the need to expand this view to include a larger set of
natural kinds. On this more liberal view, it is not only the hard sciences that
can provide us with the most basic elements of reality, but largely corroborated
elements of “soft” sciences such as psychology or economics are also candidate
natural kinds.
Under this new view of natural kinds, it is no longer the case that scientific
categories are either natural or spurious. Rather, certain scientific kinds can be
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seen as positioned somewhere between two extremes, one purely explanatory
of the structure of reality and the other linked to more particular interests of
a pragmatic kind (Craver 2009). Kinds can be seen as more or less natural.
Our concern, therefore, should not be so much to list or inventory the deep
constituents of reality, but rather to establish some rigorous regulative ideals
as to what kind of categories should be part of science6. The aim, to be sure,
is both regulative and descriptive, for by examining the way scientific commu-
nities structure their conceptual landscapes, questions about the naturalness
of kinds may also inform us about which practices are useful to the pursuit of
scientific knowledge.
To further understand the relevance of the question, it may first be useful
to quickly mention two different ways in which animal culture was seriously
(and unsuccesfully) thought to be based on a natural kind.
The way the concept of animal culture is currently used in animal behaviour
research is largely independent of the exact social learning mechanisms at the
root of cultural propagation. In fact, the great diversity of mechanisms of social
learning has been and continues to be a subject of intense study (see Whiten
et al. 2004; and also Hoppitt & Laland 2013, Chapter 4). Up until the 1990s,
however, imitation was considered by some researchers to be a key diagnostic
sign of the presence of culture in a species.
In 1992, in a much cited article provocatively titled “The question of animal
culture”, Bennett Galef (who later became president of the Animal Behavior
Society for a number of years) noted that in absence of proof of the existence of
real imitation, certain behaviours observed in birds or chimpanzees could not
be said to be cultural. Primatologist Michael Tomasello took the logic behind
this idea a bit further by conceiving of a general model of cumulative culture
in which such a form of cultural propagation was not possible without what
he then termed “true imitation” (Tomasello 1999).
Despite their considerable influence in this area of research, Galef and
Tomasello did not succeed in imposing their terminological and theoretical
points of view. The view linking true imitation and culture no longer holds.
Forms of true imitation have been observed in other animals, including apes.
Since then, the use of the animal culture concept has expanded considerably
without really taking into account the requirement of a very specific form
of social learning. The presence of what amounts to a diversity of forms of
imitative learning has also been established in chimpanzees. And both Galef
and Tomasello have revised their initial positions on this matter.
To be clear, appeals to true imitation as a diagnostic sign of the presence
of culture were not gratuitous, but were rather aimed at establishing a gen-
uine natural kind based on the evolutionary study of behaviour. Part of the
logic at work here was that if social learning was sustained by true imitation,
then a series of nomothetic cultural dynamics should follow (for example what
Tomasello called the “ratchet effect” of cultural propagation). Stated more
6 This is of course a very rough summary of a complex issue in the philosophy of science
(for a detailed account see Lemeire 2015; Ereshefsky & Reydon 2015; Martinez 2015). For
a rebuttal of the philosophical project of natural kinds altogether, see Hacking 2007
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simply, the operation of the social learning mechanism of true imitation was
thought to provide an inductive basis robust enough to characterize a natural
form of culture, i.e, natural, in the sense that one could use the concept of cul-
ture to justify meaningful generalizations based on a causal account. This is
not the place to discuss the specifics, but the empirical basis for the inductive
generalizations premised on true imitation is not as strong now as it once was
thought to be (Morin, 2015).
Another once relatively popular stance on the question of the naturalness
of culture can be linked to the popularity of memetics, or if you prefer, to the
belief in the existence of an entity that underlies culture, that is, a cultural
substance. Although one can accept that modeling the causality of cultural
propagation in this way can be useful in some instances, it is certainly not the
case that this results in a valid general characterization of culture. The memetic
approach to culture typically appeals to models provided by Mendelian genet-
ics, population dynamics, and DNA replication. In this manner, culture is
considered as a form of heredity that allows one to infer a number of nomoth-
etic regularities and causal generalizations. On other related accounts, those
nomothetic regularities are supposedly derived from the nature of culture as
“information” (Lewens 2014; Ramsey 2013). The problem with this approach
is that it places undue focus on the general characteristics of so-called ‘cultural
information”, thereby disregarding the specific diversity of mechanisms that
drive social learning and propagation. Moreover, however useful the culture
as information approach might prove as a modeling simplification in some in-
stances, if taken as a definition of culture in general, it seriously hinders our
ability to understand cultural phenomena. The main reasons (for details see
Anonymized), are twofold:
1. By appealing to the concept of information one may be presupposing ex-
actly what deserves an explanation, namely the nature of social influence
and the properties (both evolutionary and mechanistic) that make that
influence relatively lasting and relatively widespread in a population.
2. In the case of “animal culture” reifying information is very much at odds
with the current practice and methodology of most studies on the phenom-
ena linked to this concept. In these studies, information as such is seldom
invoked as an explanatory resource (if anything it serves as an explanan-
dum more often than as an explanans). Information, it is true, is a concept
that is frequent in the mathematical modeling approach to the evolution
of cultural capacities. Such a use, however, may be easily considered to be
one of the assumptions or simplifications at work in those models rather
than as a very solid ontological statement regarding the reality that these
models aim to describe.
Given the range of diverse social learning mechanisms by which a form
of animal behaviour can be said to be cultural, and given the lack of any
general causal property or substance (“cultural information”) that offers a
solid inductive basis for making valid generalizations, it seems legitimate to
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ask whether animal culture is a natural kind. And if it isn’t then how might
we best describe it?
4.1 Homology
In order to tackle the naturalness of the concept of animal culture, other more
promising strategies than the two already outlined still remain. We might
find inspiration in the way that other wide-ranging biological or psychological
traits have been characterized as natural kinds. Two general strategies can be
deployed in an effort to carve biological traits at nature’s joints: the search for
homologies, and the search for an evolved function.
The first approach relates to the quest for biological precursors to hu-
man culture in other animals. Since the publication of Darwin’s The Origin
of Species, homology has been considered to be the product of descent by
modification. In the same way, from a natural kinds perspective, it is descent
by modification that might explain the resemblance among biological traits,
and that guarantees the inductive generalizations which may derive from such
resemblance (Brigandt & Griffiths 2007). Thus, human dispositions for cul-
ture may maintain certain homology relations with other capacities present in
primates, most especially, our closest living relatives, the great apes.
But homology of what? At what level is a resemblance to be traced in
order for the category of culture to have some basis in homology? Usually,
findings of anatomical homologies enjoy a more robust theoretical status. The
notion of anatomical homology is less disputed and less controversial than the
notion of functional homology (Love 2007). However the notion of anatomical
homology is also problematic in the context of searching for precursors to a
given type of behaviour. Linking anatomy or genetics with behaviour is not a
straightforward task. Besides, the description of behaviour itself typically re-
quires the use of finalistic or functional language. In practice, when faced with
the lack of precise genetic or cerebral data needed for sustaining a compara-
tive approach between human cultural capacities and those of other primate
species, behavioural level functional homologies (Herrmann et al. 2007 ) have
been the most intensively studied in the search for the naturalness of animal
culture. Such was the state of the field when the debates about the lack of
true imitation in other species arose. One way of framing the question about
true imitation was to ask whether it was a human evolutionary innovation or
what is referred to in systematics as an apomorphy, or whether it was shared
with other primates by common descent thus constituting a synapomorphy.
Our actual knowledge of the comparative study of behaviour shows that
our species shares several behavioural synapomorphies with other species that
are relevant to the description of social behaviour (Gomez 2005). However, our
species also presents a series of behavioural apomorphies that probably were
not present in our common ancestor with other great apes (see Carruthers
2006, pp. 154-157 for a long list of plausible candidates). The existence of
these apomorphies, many of which may have cultural significance, as well as
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the ubiquity of animal cultures in taxa as distant from each other as corvids,
primates, or even fruit-flies (Lihoreau & Simpson 2012; Logan et al. 2016) may
suggest that the homological approach is very limited in its ability to respond
to the question of the naturalness of animal culture.
4.2 General selection pressures
What about the other option of grounding a biological natural kind on its
evolved function? This approach is linked to the quest for selection pressures
that are strong and general enough to account for the emergence of cultural ca-
pacities. If such sufficiently strong and general selection pressures are detected,
these could in principle inform us about the form and function of the adapted
trait in a relatively wide range of environments, thus providing a causal basis
for inductive generalizations.
The idea of convergent evolution supposes that given enough biological
variation, natural selection is able to produce highly similar biological traits
in fairly distant taxonomic lineages provided their evolutionary environments
are sufficiently similar. Much in the same way dolphin fins and shark fins
resemble each other by virtue of their common evolutionary environment, dif-
ferent forms of animal culture may resemble each other by virtue of a given
trait or disposition’s more general evolved function.
The most common critique against this approach is certainly the limiting
role of morphogenetic factors (see Thierry 2000). Not just anything can evolve
from anything. A great deal of the time, behavioural ecological theory is just
theory in search of empirical corroboration. To assume, for argument’s sake,
that this is not an issue is to subscribe to the usual “phenotypic gambit”
(Grafen 1991), a working hypothesis that can be legitimately pursued as such.
So let’s judge this approach on its own terms.
Certain evolutionary models that are general enough in scope could in
principle provide an anchor based on sufficiently strong and general selective
pressures. For instance, the “costly information hypothesis” (Coolen et al.
2003; Kendal et al. 2011) links the evolution of a general form of social learning
with the costs and benefits of exploring problems in the environment when
these problems have already been tackled by other individuals. According to
other general models linking cultural learning with certain forms of variability
in the selective environment, the development of a cultural form of life would
be closely linked with changing selection pressures and the need to adapt to a
plurality of environments (see Potts 1998 on the variability selection thesis).
It follows that culture would be, in Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson’s (2000)
felicitous phrase, “built for speed not for comfort”. In other words, a capacity
for acquiring adaptive solutions that have already been acquired by some other
individual in response to problems in the environment. Such a disposition
would be especially well-suited for rapidly changing selective environments.
However rich these general models might be in theoretical insights they also
have obvious limitations when it comes to providing a general explanation for
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the vast domain of animal cultures. Some of these limitations are intrinsic.
For instance, variability selection models are only valid within certain param-
eters of environmental variability, leaving aside other forms of social learning
mechanisms that would be expected under different conditions (Mcelreath &
Strimling 2008). Moreover, ceteris paribus, cultural stability as such (“animal
traditions”) is not selected for in rapidly changing selective regimes.
But other limitations are extrinsic, almost by definition. Thus, in as much
as certain forms of social learning could be an evolutionary accident or byprod-
uct of other evolved characteristics, an evolved function, no matter how gen-
eral, could not cover those cases that are not strictly functional. In this case,
the developmental constraints that we had ruled out for the sake of the ar-
gument, would come back with a vengeance. They would do so not so much
in the form of evolutionary constraints but rather as components and aspects
of certain social learning processes not strictly covered by an approach that
focused exclusively on evolutionary function.
5 Possible ways forward
5.1 Homeostatic cluster?
Another one of the most recently favored notions of what a biological natural
kind is, points to yet another distinctive approach. This is the concept of a
natural kind as a “homeostatic property cluster” (Boyd 1991). According to
this modern view of natural kinds, many natural kinds are not so much char-
acterized by necessary and sufficient conditions that establish membership,
but rather by a more flexible set of properties, some of which tend to clus-
ter together following causal regularities. Thus, the presence of one or several
of these characteristics may be considered a reliable indicator of the statisti-
cal cooccurrence of other properties. In order for the category to constitute
a natural and not simply notional kind, this statistical cooccurrence must be
established on a causal basis.
In recent years, certain wide-ranging biological categories whose natural-
ness was also disputed (the concepts of “species”, “organism” or the concept
of “life” itself) have been approached from this point of view (Dieguez 2013).
The fact that the most common concept of animal culture is composed of
what we called “cultural properties” may provide an idea of how to proceed.
If the aforementioned cultural properties tended to cluster together on a suffi-
ciently reliable basis, established from the causal properties of certain forms of
social learning mechanisms, then it would make sense to talk of a homeostatic
property cluster of culture. Is this indeed the case?
The answer cannot be given on an a priori basis. A population of cultural
agents can satisfy some of the properties of a cultural behaviour (social learn-
ing, stability, relative frequency in the population) to varying degrees without
those properties being necessarily linked. Logical necessity is precisely the kind
of necessity that is invoked and rejected here. The empirical details depend on
Animal cultures: but of which kind? 13
the specifics of the social learning mechanisms and the diffusion process (see
Claidiere & Sperber 2010).
The homeostatic property cluster of culture may be positively regarded as
an ambitious but interesting working hypothesis in the search for a natural
kind of culture. It is not, however, a hypothesis whose methodology appears
straightforward. Louis Lefevbre, Simon Reader and collaborators have shown
how a related behavioural kind —the rate of behavioural innovation– can be
evolutionarily associated to a cluster of biologically relevant characteristics
such as rate of social learning or relative size of association areas in the brain
in both primates and birds (Reader & Laland 2002; Lefevbre et al. 2004).
The use of a similar methodology could test the foundations of some forms
of homeostatic property cluster concepts of culture. Success, however, is not
guaranteed in advance.
5.2 Reduction
Considering the diversity of mechanisms and patterns of diffusion that poten-
tially participate in the propagation of cultural behaviour one might reason-
ably wager that if any clusters of properties are to be found, the most reliably
co-occurring ones will be found at a specific rather than general level.
Were clusters — or even families of clusters — of interesting causal prop-
erties to be discovered exclusively at a lower level, that could, in principle,
also be a reason for a reduction of the original category. In this kind of re-
ductionism, the upper level category is now absorbed by a narrower category.
The loss of extension of the older term could then be justified to the extent
that the new category has a more robust inductive structure. The division of
previously established biological or psychological categories into more natural
categories (Grifiths 1997) ––thereby resulting in the older categories’ loss of
extension — is not without precedent.
On this scenario, considering the naturalness of culture, the bottle is half
full. According to this, we may have one or various populational concepts of
animal cultures well anchored in the existence of generally recognized case
studies or prototypes (Catherine Driscoll’s 2016 proposal amounts to a similar
strategy). This general reduction strategy allows the proliferation of special
models to explain different cultural dynamics. Stated in the terms of a promi-
nent text book on the categories of the philosophy of biology, the naturalness
of a kind is discovered “not through the construction of definitions at the be-
ginning of inquiry, but, if we are lucky, as the culmination of inquiry” (Sterelny
& Griffiths, 1999, p. 357).
5.3 Elimination
One can also claim that the bottle is empty. A few years ago, asked to state one
scientific idea whose time is due, several researchers in anthropology answered
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with the concept of culture 7. As mentioned in the introduction, this is not a
radically new idea in that discipline.
Consider anthropologist Pascal Boyer’s argumentation, and how it can be
similarly applied to the case of animal culture. Briefly, he argues that if culture
is an overly encompassing concept there may be nothing of interest which can
be said “in general” about it. In the same sense that there can not be a science
of trees —he claims— there can be no science of culture. Group dynamics and
social psychological models may allow for generalizations at a lower level, but
not at the most general one. Pascal Boyer is calling for what philosophers of
science call an “elimination” of the concept of culture.
Perhaps, in the field of animal behaviour, there is but a small step be-
tween the actual landscape in which culture is an articulated concept inside
a network of other concepts, and an eliminativist landscape in which social
learning occupies the large central node of the network much as it does al-
ready. Consequently, the other properties associated with cultural phenomena
(stability, distribution in a population, etc.) should be referred to in a more
explicit fashion. In fact, “social learning8” does already play a larger articu-
lating role than that of “culture”, a term which tended to be avoided by some
researchers (e.g. Fragaszy & Perry 2003 considered the epistemological inter-
est of the term “culture” to be too anthropocentric). A weaker version of this
eliminativist position may still accept the use of the concept in a descriptive
fashion, as an explanandum, while proscribing its role as an explanans. Under
such a view, the culturality of a trait is a feature in search of an explanation
(not an explanation itself). The adjective “cultural” can thus survive easily
(Sperber 1996), whereas the reference to culture would be unduly essential-
ist. The strongest eliminativist version calls for a stricter use of language and
proscriptions against the idea of culture altogether.
6 Conclusion: Carving into an outdated epistemic object
I have shown that there are serious reasons why one can doubt that animal
culture is a natural kind in its current state. The fact that it is not solidly
anchored in one of the several available theories (homology, selection pressures,
information, etc.) purported to reveal its inductive nature is the main obstacle.
It was reasonably hoped that the animal culture concept could in principle
provide a basis for the foundation of the natural kind of culture. That it did
not, also raises doubts as to the naturalness of the idea of culture in general. If
I have suggested a methodologically challenging way to explore Homeostatic
Property Cluster concepts of animal culture, the truth is that elimination (in
some of its different forms) appears as the risk-averse choice from a natural
kinds perspective.
7 The question was asked by the Edge Foundation and the answers are available at:
www.edge.org/contributors/what-scientific-idea-is-ready-for-retirement
8 Although the notion of social learning is not entirely without problems either, both from
a mechanistic perspective (Reisman 2007) and as a contender for a natural kind (Heyes 2012).
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One could also glean a less radical epistemological lesson from the previ-
ous analysis of the conceptual network of animal culture. Even strong elim-
inativists such as Pascal Boyer recognize that culture is a convenient term
to describe “cultural stuff”, however various and disparate this stuff might
be. Moreover, scientific research does sometimes need central concepts that
are not strictly natural kinds. Culture might be seen in retrospect to have
played the role of “epistemic object” (Muˆller-Wille & Rheinberger 2012), a
placeholder whose definition and conceptual range remain vague and yet nev-
ertheless prove powerful enough to assemble a field of research and create wide
meaningful connections deemed worthy of exploration due in part to the ex-
istence of available techniques. In the field of animal behaviour, a series of
research methods and techniques have been deployed both in the lab and in
the field in the pursuit of this epistemic object that is culture (Sabater Pi
1978; Whiten et al. 1999; Rendel & Whitehead 2001; Horner & De Waal 2009;
and more generally Hoppit & Laland 2013, Chapters 5-7). These methods and
techniques opened a new space to build knowledge around a topic that was
almost entirely ignored only a few decades ago. And yet these methods and
techniques come with their own array of limitations which have already been
pointed out in the past (e.g. Laland & Janik 2006; Langergraber et al. 2016;
Koops et al. 2014) and which leave their own grey areas.
There have always been influential figures in this field of research which at
some time or other have called a halt on using the concept of culture altogether.
I suspect that the simple removal of the central term of an important amount
of work led in this area cannot transform the field by mere fiat. Pragmatic
interests might also privilege the continued use of the term for the purpose of
scientific communication. However, understanding the crudeness of the etho-
logical concept of culture can only promote progress. For this partly outdated
epistemic object (recall its humble XIXth century roots! ) should be considered
a rough rock from which to smooth and carve more specific causal models
related to learning mechanisms, behavioural ecology, diffusion dynamics and
the stability of traditions.
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